HOW TO UNDERSTAND RUSSIA, AND HOW NOT TO

Autocracy it is
Having gone through a period of radical political transformation and economic crises Russia is back as a world player. It re-emerged gradually, but its recent direct involvement in Syria, its sightings within the context of the American election and finally its 2014-2022 ‘Ukrainian campaign’ brought it back to the Westerners’ attention. Russia, in the eyes of an average Westerner, is an exotic and somewhat incomprehensible place. Russian bears, Russian dolls, Russian oligarchs, Russian brides, Russian vodka, Russian baths. A soft form of ‘Orientalism’, if you ask me. ‘Natasha from Russia’ will tell you everything you need to know about that…

A lot has been written on Russia by serious scholars since the collapse of communism and the access to the archival materials that followed. However, the area of Russian studies in the Western academia never stagnated. Robert Conquest, Robert Service, Richard Pipes, Orlando Figes published maybe 50 books on the Soviet period of Russian history, all before 1990. There is even a ‘revisionist’ school of Russian history, as is appropriate in our day and age, in the form of a bunch of academics for whom repressions are not repressions, labour camps are not as bad as they seem, victims are not as numerous as previously thought, everything is painfully ‘complicated’ and ‘nuanced’. (You would have figured out where my sympathies are).

The sheer amount of materials, compositions and views makes it difficult to get a clear signal. Russia’s recent surfacing in Western politics brought a question to the Western mind: is Soviet Union back in the form of Putin? A recent overview of Russian polls emphasised that a significant proportion of Russians ‘misses’ the Soviet realities-a finding considered puzzling. So: what is Russia? What explains its political culture?

There is a key to understanding Russia. It is in one word: autocracy. The thesis decisively explaining Russian political culture is found in a single, small-size book, by Richard Pipes, a Jewish -American historian and policy advisor: ‘Russian Conservatism and its Critics’. The book is styled as an intellectual history of Russia, however, in actual fact, it is simply a window into the political mind of an average Russian. A large body of historical writings by people mentioned above will furnish curiosities without end: on the characters of the Russian and Soviet leaders, their philosophies, their struggles, social and cultural life of the USSR, its prisons, libraries, markets, factories. But anyone who is interested in grasping the ‘principle’ of Russia should familiarize themselves with Pipes’ book.

Russia is an autocracy, in principle, and in spirit, and in habit, and in praxis. ‘Autocracy is a strong centralised authority unrestrained either by law or parliament, ‘ says Pipes. Its rationale and its ‘filling’ changed from generation to generation, but the principle never did. Pipes defines his terms and outlines the thesis in the introductory chapter of his book, and the rest of the book is devoted to explaining the origins of the autocratic political culture on one hand and to the case studies of the Russian ‘conservative philosophers’, i.e. those thinkers, authors and politicians responsible for the development of arguments about the necessity and the merits of autocracy.

Why is that so?

What made Russia so uncompromisingly autocratic? Pipes answers this question by showing what made the West non-autocratic, and these are, according to him, three things: (1) the early European tribal culture; (2) the Roman law and (3) the Catholic church. The early European tribal culture is responsible for the notion of basic equality of people, as individuals, and for the sanctity of private property. The Roman law -for the notion of pubic authority as rooted in the will and need of people. The Catholic church was the final ‘icing on the cake’. It provided a source of authority additional to the authority of a ruler, and , at time, alternative to the secular authority. Western political traditions grew on the soil where a simple individual was perceived as a worthy and autonomous being, entitled to some rights, and where multiple sources of authority competed with each other for the hearts of people. Maturation of the West as we know it was not free of struggles and setbacks, and it was slow, but the predisposition was there, and it led to what we understand today as a proper relationship between the state and the people, and between people.

Nothing of sorts happened in Russia. Russia never found itself under the influence of the Roman law-which could have led to the idea of a parliament as a proper decision making structure. Instead, it separated itself from the Rome-dominated world and looked towards Byzantium, with the adoption of the Eastern form of Christianity as a consequence. It never developed a mature idea of private property either: the land and the people of Russia were owned, in a literal sense through most of its history and in symbolic sense-after the abolition of serfdom- by its emperors. The Russian aristocracy was enjoying the status of ‘slaves of the crown’-a situation, and terminology, incomprehensible for the Western mind, then and now. The Russian church never obtained a status of autonomous source of authority, early in its history it was completely subjugated by the crown. And if that was not enough, for about 250 years Russia was dominated by the Mongols, mighty rulers from the far East who only briefly visited Europe, assimilated into the Middle East but ruled and used Russia from the distance. Their presence and the style of government took Russia further from the West and strengthened the existing autocratic predispositions.

A breathtaking summary of the typically Russian attitude in politics is found in the policies of the Russian emperor Paul I whose rule extended into the very beginning of the 19th century. Paul I forbade the use of words ‘fatherland’ and ‘freedom’, replacing them by ‘state’ and ‘permission’, respectively. The word ‘society’ was outlawed completely.

The Westerners who get over-excited by today’s Russian politics, and especially by Putin, and are tempted to view it as some sort of a comeback of the Soviet Union will benefit from Pipes’ perspective, I sense. There is no ‘comeback’ of the USSR. There is an amazing continuity with what Russia always was, before communism, during communism, and after communism. Putin is one of many rulers that Russia had, and he is not the worst. Arguably, he is not the best either, but then who is Russia’s best ruler? There is absolutely nothing special about Putin. He is almost ahistorical. He rules his country in a nearly-millennial tradition. There is no other tradition he can rely on. There is no other tradition on which the West can, and wishes to, rely, apart from its own, historically determined. Over 80% of Russians approve of Putin today (according to both the pro-government and dissident pollsters in Russia), and the levels of approval have never been below 60% since 1999. And not only that: levels of Putin’s approval as well as the levels of political optimism jump up in response to surges of military activity between Russia and Ukraine. Stalin’s rule is seen as bringing Russia ‘just good’, or ‘good and bad in equal measure’, by a similar majority of Russians. Both Russian rulers and Russian people act within the limits of the autocractic tradition. This is not surprizing and not going to end soon.

Why is this important? Because any policies towards Russia that are not cognizant of this reality are likely to result in ‘misunderstandings’ which – when translated into the language of international politics- means war, war and more war…The exact reasons behind the appearance of the stubborn autocratic tradition are less important than the reality of the tradition itself. In that sense, whether or not Pipes’ tribal culture, Roman law and Catholic church are the actual major shapers of the difference between the Russian and the Western political traditions is a less important question than the fact that the Russian tradition remained in its place before communism, during communism and after communism. We are dealing , therefore, with something very stubborn indeed that ought to be accounted for in political dealings. The attempts to ignore that ‘something’ or change it forcibly will end up in tears, as John Mersheimer reminds us.

Why is it so homophobic then?

So far the political realities…now to the operations of the ‘Russian mind’ beyond the political authority. Being an ‘expert on all things Russian’ , I am often asked (by the Westerners) to explain it, and if I have to choose the most frequently asked question (by the Westerners still) that would be ‘why is the Russian culture so homophobic?’ The statis of this question should not be at all surprising. As will be shown shortly, attitudes towards homosexuality are a flagship of Western liberalism. In the eyes of many they turned into a symbolic representation of the Western way of life, a key element of society open to different lifestyles and respectful of individual self-expression. In the West itself, it must be added, this is a very new development, in historical perspective, things used to be very different even a generation ago, but by now, the situation is well-established.

So let us use this question as a departure point. First, is the Russian culture homophobic? The one -word answer is ‘yes’, the five -word answer is ‘it is not just Russia’. Here is a story in one exhibit (Figure 1).

This unique picture is made possible by collation of data from three Pew Research Centre surveys, the latest being ‘Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe‘. The leader of tolerance in relation to homosexuality is Great Britain, where 76% agree with the statement that homosexuality should be accepted by society. And the leader of non-acceptance is Armenia. We are not talking about ‘gay marriage’ here, ladies and gentlemen. Acceptance by society….!

The only Eastern European country that is comparable to Western European levels is Czech Republic. It is followed, at some distance, by Poland and Hungary. Incidentally, Israel is sandwiched between them. Eastern European levels of acceptance of homosexuality in general are quite far from Western Europe and they become lower as one moves further East and into the past Soviet zone of influence. In Russia and Ukraine, in particular, just 6%-7% thinks that homosexuality should be accepted.

‘Anti-homosexual stance’ is self-evidently a strong cultural fixture of the entire Orthodox Christian world, not just Russia; and by ‘Christian Orthodox’ I mean the part of the world where the official church is Christian Orthodox, as opposed to Catholic or Protestant. The Catholic parts of Eastern Europe look -all of the sudden- as a bedrock of liberalism towards homosexuality: Hungary, Poland, Croatia all have very sizable minorities accepting of homosexuality. The ‘trick’ here is not Catholicism in itself but the fact that, being Catholic, these Eastern European countries are culturally closer to the Catholic -comparatively more liberal-world. Catholic minorities in Ukraine and Belarus-and they are numerically significant-are as opposed to homosexuality as their Christian Orthodox neighbours.

Staunch anti-homosexualism is a strong civilizational feature of those parts of Eastern Europe that remain under the Russian cultural influence. Given the situation we are in today, it merits highlighting that Ukraine is indistinguishable from Russia when it comes to attitudes towards homosexuality.

And the most amazing thing for whoever is used to Western realities-there is no age gradient to this (Figure 2). It is not like the young are more open towards homosexuality than the old, as the Western cultures would have it. The only exception is Greece, where those so adamantly opposed to homosexuality are a minority, and a strong Western type age gradient exists.

What can explain the observed patterns?

Some suggested that, perhaps, the whole anti-Western orientation of Russia may have something to do with it, as in: Russia does not like the West to start with, the West does not mind homosexuality, so Russia does not like homosexuality, because..well, …it has to, homosexuality is a Western invention. Some others said that it is something else, ‘something cultural’ perhaps, after all , even the more West leaning parts of Eastern Europe (Latvia, Lithuania…) are not too keen on homosexuality. So, what is it?

I think, the truth is in between the two arguments above. Let us start from the first argument: anti-homosexuality is a variation of anti-Western sentiment. I think, it may be very true NOW. The anti-Western orientation of Russia lifted its head, and with it sharp attentiveness to what the West does differently and their ‘strange ways’. So, the Russian collective political mind identifies the greatest dividing themes and indulges in analysis and development of oppositionality, almost for the sake of it, using these themes. Undoubtedly, this is happening. But the perception of homosexuality as something undesirable, at the very least, had been there before the recent wave of anti-Western feeling. And during the Cold War times, for example, Russia/USSR citizens had no idea about the homosexuality’s status in the West, indeed, many did not know that it ‘existed’ in the most fundamental terms. Extreme negativity towards homosexuality marked Soviet times and was unrelated to its contemporary status of ‘a Western darling’. That brings us back to the ‘cultural’ explanation.

What is this cultural explanation? Religion? Until recently Eastern Europe and Russia were religious in the most superficial sense. In fact, Russia is the least religious place in Europe with the lowest levels of church attendance: 7% of Russians attend church weekly, in contrast to 40% of Poles.  A Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin, who is an exciting new discovery of the generally clueless Western political commentators, made an amazing in its disingenuity attempt to portray Russia as a protector of some sort of religiosity by sharing the following imagery on his Facebook account.

Do not be mislead by this.  It is the best example of the ‘construction of identity’ where there is none. Presenting Russia as an umbrella under which angelic-looking deeply religious elements can shelter from the Western agendas of fascism, LGBT-ism, Americanism and something else, next to angels themselves, is a ‘bit rich’ given those 70 years of communism that saw mass destruction of churches and ‘liquidation of clergy as a class’. More to the point, genuine religiosity or the return of religiosity in this part of the world are hard to imagine; the population is utterly ‘out of habit’ in that sense.

And, additionally, the degree is religiosity is only very weakly related to the acceptance of homosexuality there now. I have not presented these data, but the Pew Research Centre surveys asked whether people defined themselves as Christian and those who did -did not show higher levels of non-acceptance of homosexuality, be it Christianity of the Russian Orthodox Church or Catholicism. So, that hypothesis has to be dismissed.

Let us try this: an ‘attention to detail’ hypothesis-which is a version of the ‘Western individualism’ versus ‘Eastern communitarianism’, hypothesis. One thing that many recent immigrants from Eastern Europe to the West point out as the most remarkable difference between the two worlds is the unconditional attention to individual peculiarities of character, taste and, as follows, lifestyle. This attention to the individual wish is taken for granted, and, by now, almost entirely out of the zone of self-reflection, in the West, but it is omnipresent, and very defining. At its core is the belief, or acceptance, that individuals are precious, and their preferences should be met without being understood in any profound way. Just because they exist, just because this makes them comfortable, just because, people should be ‘worked with’ rather than ‘worked against’.

Milk allergy in adulthood is not very common, and so what? There would be thousands of dairy free products-to indulge every taste. Use of wheelchairs is not common, and so what? There will be a ramp in every building. There will be 900 channels for evening entertainment, 10,000 self-help books on every aspect of personal or professional life that needs help. Because individual needs are precious and need to be answered not questioned. Eastern Europe, it seems to me, more readily questions first and answers later, if at all.

Homosexuality, as an exclusive preference, is distinctly a minority preference. So, to many people it will appear as a peculiar desire, or taste. Including in the West. But peculiarity of taste, and the normalcy of individual expression is something that the West does not question, it is almost disinterested at this point. Many sexual practices are peculiar and many preferences are highly individual, most of that ‘highly individual’ staff takes place between people belonging to two different sexes. Do these preferences have to be profoundly understood? The West says no. The East, embodies by Russia, cannot do that. It cannot stop being questioning and prescriptive towards the individual.

As a final proof that communitarianism, or collectivism, is the strong characteristic of Russia and its civilisational space (rather than traditionalism or religiosity, say), I am presenting to you a values map of the world, created by a fine pair of political economists, Inglehart and Welzel, at some point in the beginning of the 21st century.

The map shows how countries of the world sit, simultaneously, on two dimensions. One dimension is the degree of *rationality vs tradition* or, alternatively put, *science vs religion*- it is vertical on the map. In some contexts, religious and cultural traditions are very strong and science has trouble of affecting, let alone governing, these societies in any meaningful way. The other dimension is *collectivist survival vs individual self expression*, it is horizontal. Societies that are weak economically often fight over resources, and their values reflect this-individualism is not tolerated there, it is a luxury, only societies that prosper can afford it.

Human development/development, say Inglehart and Welzel, is a movement from the bottom left corner of the map (where all collectivist and religious societies sit) towards the top right corner (where all individualistic and rather secular societies sit). Diagonal movement, in short…. Initially, all countries sit in the bottom left corner, and then some of them start drifting diagonally. Of course, culture matters-not just the economy-and some movements on this diagonal are less extreme; and some are not on the diagonal actually- Eastern Europe and Latin America move only towards rationality but not self expression (the former) and others just towards self expression but not rationality (the latter).

For examples, focus on the map’s top left corner. You will see there Eastern Europe with Russia and Ukraine placed in the top left corner of the top left corner, the most extreme position possible! They are the most irreligious and, at the same time, collectivist places on the planet. Voila…What else needs to be said. Not much. Except that in the case of Russia (and Ukraine!) we are dealing with consistently autocratic and fiercely collectivist cultures. All types of data and all types of research methods testify to that like the proverbial thousand witnesses. That cannot be changed, or ignored, but only ‘lived with’.